Geostrategic Media Political Commentary, Analysis, Security, Defense
After the successful US regime-change military action in Venezuela, it appears Washington is aiming for a similar endeavor again—this time in the Middle East against Iran. Mass mobilization of US military assets—most notably the deployment of a naval armada in the Arabian Sea, the forward deployment of the Patriot air defense system and THAAD missile defense systems, and the sudden evacuation of non-essential personnel from regional military bases—reflect advance preparatory measures by Washington for kinetic action against Iran. Amid heightening tension, a few incidents have already taken place. Iran has seized two foreign oil tankers for allegedly smuggling oil and has attempted to approach US-flagged tankers. The US Navy F-35C has shot down a Shahed-139 MALE UAV in the Arabian Sea. As tensions are rising, tankers are speeding up to leave the Persian Gulf. The US Department of Transportation Maritime Administration has already issued guidelines to US-flagged commercial ships to keep distance from Iran’s territorial waters and reject Iranian forces’ permission to board ship.
It’s apparent that the Trump Administration doesn’t want prolonged engagement but rather a quick, precise, and decisive operation, likely for regime change. The US Navy is expected to take the lead using carrier-based airpower and cruise missile strikes from guided missile destroyers (DDGs) and nuclear guided missile attack submarines (SSGNs), likely to be supplemented or followed by bombardment by US Air Force bombers flying either from the US mainland or from Diego Garcia. But unlike the Venezuela operation, which was conducted in the American backyard, Washington has limited territorial room available for military action against Tehran since the denial of territorial support by Gulf nations. Therefore, it’s likely that if Washington eventually decides to go kinetic, it will be through the naval domain.
And it makes complete sense. At sea, the US enjoys overwhelming technological superiority. Currently the US Navy has nine warships in the region. Three Independence-class Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) are stationed in the Persian Gulf but are of limited value, as these vessels carry no credible offensive capability. The most prominent formation exists in the Arabian Sea, led by the USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN-72) nuclear-powered aircraft carrier with embarked Carrier Air Wing Nine (CVW-9). The CVW-9 comprises F-35C Lightning II stealth fighters, F/A-18 E/F Super Hornet combat aircraft, E/A-18G Growler electronic warfare jets, E-2D Hawkeye Airborne Early Warning Aircraft (AEWs), and MH-60R Sea Hawk Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) helicopters. CVN-72 is accompanied by three Aegis-equipped Arleigh Burke-class DDGs—each armed with Tomahawk cruise missiles for offensive missions and an arsenal of air-defense missiles for multi-layer defense. Two additional Arleigh Burke-class DDGs with similar weapon configurations are deployed in the Strait of Hormuz. Besides surface combatants, an unknown number of Ohio-class SSGNs—each equipped with a formidable payload of 154 land attack Tomahawk cruise missiles—are also patrolling in the area. In theory, this naval armada is an instrument of coercion at sea, capable of projecting power against Iran as well as establishing local sea control in the Arabian Sea. The employment of force through the maritime domain against various types of targets, including military targets like air-defense systems, nuclear enrichment facilities, and missile sites; high-visibility targets like economic infrastructure; and high-value targets like Iran’s political leadership itself, will also complicate Iran’s defensive measures, as the US Navy can launch multiple vectors from multiple directions over vast oceanic distances.
Any Iranian retaliation will likely mirror this logic. In a low-level response, Tehran may opt for assertive signaling in the maritime domain, i.e., harassing merchant shipping and conducting naval exercises. A mid-level escalation could result in counterstrikes on military assets of the US or its allies in the Gulf. Only in an existential scenario would Iran attempt a full maritime escalation, such as a deliberate effort to impose a sustained blockade in the Strait of Hormuz. Such a move would represent a strategic gamble with global consequences and will likely trigger overwhelming retaliation.
Iran, for its part, understands this asymmetry well. The Iranian Navy, with its obsolete surface and subsurface fleet, stands no chance against the US Navy in a traditional conflict. However, Iran has structured its naval strategy on sea denial rather than sea control. The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy (IRGC-N) operates hundreds of fast-attack crafts (FACs) equipped with missiles and rockets for saturated strikes against surface vessels. In addition, hundreds of coastal missiles and suicide drones have been dispersed throughout the Iranian coast. Besides, Iran has commissioned rudimentary specialized vessels, like Shahid Bagheri, Shahid Roudaki, and Shahid Mahdavi, which have the capability to launch swarms of drones and containerized missiles at floating targets. Together, these assets manifest Iran’s asymmetrical warfare strategy in the maritime domain, which seeks to overcome US defenses through overwhelming numbers.
Geography also facilitates Iran’s strategy. The Strait of Hormuz remains Tehran’s most potent political leverage. At its narrowest point between the Omani Musandam Peninsula and Iran, it is merely 33 kms wide, with the shipping lane just 3 kms wide in either direction. In any conflict, Iran’s ability to block this channel using coastal missile batteries, FACs, naval mines, midget submarines, and unmanned systems grants it the ability to deter any major aggression. The US understands this very well. Therefore, instead of venturing into close waters, the US Navy is likely to operate outside the Persian Gulf while relying on long-range vectors for Over-The-Horizon (OTH) precision strikes using distance as a buffer.
The blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, either by Iran as a coercive measure or due to the eruption of US-Iran hostilities, will have immediate ramifications at the global scale. Oil tankers carry more than 17 million barrels of oil each day through this strait, which accounts for approximately 20% of global net oil consumption. Saudi Arabia and the UAE have alternative pipelines operational, which can transit about 2.6 million barrels per day. However, compared to the net volume passing through the Strait of Hormuz, these pipelines can carry 15.29% at maximum capacity and henceforth cannot overcome the economic spillover of any disruption at the Strait of Hormuz.
Yet, for Iran, this leverage of the Strait of Hormuz is fragile and unsustainable in the longer run. Israel’s comprehensive air campaign against Iranian high-value assets and the subsequent US Operation Midnight Hammer have already exposed major capability voids in Iranian air-defense capability. The Iranian air force is obsolete, and its air defense systems—including domestic as well as Russian and Chinese systems—are mediocre at best. Against a well-coordinated multi-domain offense, it’s highly unlikely that Iran would have any credible and workable retaliatory option available at its disposal. Yes, a large stockpile of short-range ballistic missiles and drones poses a threat, but again, Israel’s precise targeting of Iran’s ballistic missile launchers during the Iran-Israel conflict indicates that the US can also undertake a similar campaign at a much greater scale employing far more robust options. This is the reason why Iran’s response is cautioned and calibrated for coercion rather than triggering a total naval war that Iran cannot win.
But the central question remains: what is Washington’s endgame with Iran? Can limited air strikes realistically cripple the current Iranian political regime or permanently degrade its nuclear ambitions, or are they more likely to justify the regime’s ideological narrative and deepen Tehran’s perceived necessity for a nuclear deterrent? Ultimately, unless Washington clearly defines a coherent political objective beyond episodic military signaling, limited air strikes risk augmenting the very strategic resolve Trump seeks to erode rather than producing a decisive shift in Tehran’s behavior.
