Tariffs, aid reduction, and diplomatic understaffing are eroding US influence, and critical mineral deals alone won’t revive it.

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By raising tariffs and slashing humanitarian and developmental aid to Africa while focusing on critical minerals extraction, President Donald Trump is boosting China and Russia’s influence in Africa despite the slowdown in China’s investments and Russia’s recently troubled military footprint in the Sahel. In their favor is Beijing and Moscow’s wooing of African countries as part of an alternative multilateral order, while the Trump administration snubs them with a decreased diplomatic presence. With Europe also slashing development aid to Africa, the West is missing an opportunity to invest in Africa’s long-term potential beyond the critical mineral sector.

How US Foreign Aid Cuts Hurt Africa

Africa is taking the brunt of the United States’ foreign aid cutbacks. The United States was the single largest donor, providing up to 26 percent of all aid going to Africa. More than half a million people with HIV may die unnecessarily in South Africa alone, according to one estimate made by South Africa’s HIV foundation. Almost 8 million people in Congo stand to lose food aid, and 2.3 million children are facing deadly malnutrition, according to the United Nations. Jakkie Cilliers, founder of the Africa-focused Institute for Security Studies (ISS), has warned that 5.7 million more Africans will be pushed into extreme poverty next year and an additional 19 million by 2030. President Trump has predicted that his own cuts will be “devastating” and called on other countries to help.

Climate assistance is being slashed not just by Trump but also by European nations, which are opting to focus on defense spending despite Africa’s growing vulnerability to climate change. According to the World Meteorological Organization, temperatures across Africa are rising at 0.3°C per decade. China has become a major partner in climate assistance and believes Africa could become a major market for green energy. Xi promised 30 clean energy projects in addition to cooperation on the nuclear sector at last year’s China-Africa summit.

The combination of Trump administration tariffs of 10 or 15 percent on most African countries (and 30 percent on South Africa) and the failure of the US Congress to extend the 25-year-old African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) is a blow to Africa’s economic aspirations and to US ties with the continent. AGOA provided duty-free access for many products, such as clothing, leather, and footwear, and the lack of its extension puts approximately 1.3 million African jobs at risk. Some of thebiggest losers are South Africa, Madagascar, Kenya, and Lesotho. In contrast, China extended tariff-free access to 53 African countries last June, triggering a 25 to 26 percent increase in Chinese exports last August. China’s trade surpassed the US’ in 2009.

Africa’s Critical Mineral Mirage

The businessman Massad Boulos, Trump’s Senior Advisor for Africa, defends Trump’s assistance cutbacks by saying Africa “doesn’t need charity,” just business deals. An area in which the United States needs Africa’s help, he says, is critical minerals. Yet the humanitarian cuts will hurt many countries and the workers who Trump and Boulos rely on to develop the critical minerals industry. Depending on child labor for cobalt mining, for example, is odious enough, but depriving these children of vaccines and food aid only adds to the injustice.

The United States is highly dependent on China for 70 percent of the critical minerals needed for manufacturing. China has invested for years in mining and the processing of critical minerals, including in Africa, which is estimated to hold 30 percent of the world’s supply. Trump and Boulos’ fixation is nothing new. In February 2023, the Biden Administration established a Mineral Security Partnership with eight mineral-rich African countries that already cooperate with China. Boulos’ negotiations of a ceasefire between Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) paved the way for Trump to announce a major US minerals agreement with the two African nations in late June. Unfortunately for Trump’s peacemaking, the conflict in eastern Congo appears to be heating up. The IMF believes Africa’s possession of critical minerals couldtransform the region, but to do so, it will need to focus on processing rather than just mining.

Trump officials recently vowed to help with “refining,” not just mining, but the scope of what is needed would be immense. Mining cannot be successful without the infrastructure to haul the minerals to market. Traditionally, the United States, unlike China, has not funded infrastructure. The partially completed Lobito Atlantic port corridor, which President Joe Biden funded and Trump supports, involves building 350 miles of new rail line in Zambia connecting its northwest region to the DRC, as well as hundreds of miles of feeder roads along the corridor, and renovating the 120-year-old Benguela railway. A BCG study stresses that no one [African] country “could master the entire mining-to-manufacturing continuum alone,” but “regional blocs such as the SADC, ECOWAS, and EAC offer immediate platforms for sharing infrastructure and coordinating investment.”

The Decline of US Interest in Africa

Shortly after Trump’s 2024 electoral victory, Reuters interviewed eight current and former officials, confirming what a review of US government watchdog reports had already shown. There had been “a dearth of staff and resources” at embassies in Africa, compromising ties under President Biden. Reuters quoted Cameron Hudson, a former CIA analyst, on how a lack of resources sidelined the United States, including the loss of a major spy base in Niger and the sudden outbreak of the Sudanese civil war in 2023.

The Trump administration is compounding the weakening of the US presence in Africa by failing to nominate ambassadors to major African posts. Except for conservative media critic Leo Brent Bozell III, yet to be confirmed as US Ambassador to South Africa, there have been no nominees for other major embassies, such as those in Nigeria, Kenya, and Ethiopia. Last April, a leaked memo, which Secretary of State Marco Rubio called “fake,” indicated a plan to cut back the US diplomatic footprint in Africa. “Lesotho, Eritrea, the Central African Republic, the Republic of Congo, Gambia, and South Sudan will have embassies closed, along with consulates in Douala, Cameroon, and Durban in South Africa.”

Despite the headwinds facing many African countries, the continent has made enormous strides toward regional unity through the African Union and economic and tech initiatives such as the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) and the landmark 2024 Continental Artificial Intelligence Strategy. In focusing solely on resources, Trump risks stirring neo-colonial resentment, underrating Africa’s economic potential in non-resource areas.

Through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China has invested in numerous infrastructure and development projects throughout Africa, part of Beijing’s efforts to connect the PRC to Europe. China has also fostered close political ties with African leaders and countries through its regular summits.

China’s African projects involve significant debt or concessions from the recipient countries. Since BRI’s founding, China has invested over $700 billion in 49 African nations, with the largest borrowers being Angola, Egypt, Kenya, Nigeria, and Ethiopia. The investments have resulted in “debt-traps” for some countries, allowing Beijing to leverage favorable treatment of Chinese firms and access to natural resources.

Djibouti presents one case study: Loans from a Chinese state-owned firmand others financed the port of Djibouti’s development, resulting in 56 percent of Djibouti’s external debt being owed to China. Consequently, in 2014, Djibouti agreed to allow the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to make use of its port and construct the PLA’s first overseas naval facilities, which were completed in 2017.

Angola is another nation in serious debt to Chinese lenders. Since 2002, Angola has borrowed more than $45 billion from China, and as of 2024, 40 percent of the country’s external debt is owed to Chinese creditors, totaling $17 billion. Despite 72 percent of Angola’s oil exports going to China, the country’s declining production in recent years has left it struggling to meet its payments.

Nevertheless, China’s total external debt is a small fraction of Africa’s debt and, according to the IMF, has been significantly “scaled back” due to China’s growing risk aversion and domestic slowdown. China’s foreign investment strategy is shifting towards “green and digital infrastructure, involving more local collaboration in project selection,” which is a welcome change. The IMF sees China trimming oil and other resource imports from Africa, undermining economic growth in Africa’s energy-exporting nations.

China is the third-largest arms supplier to African countries, and it also conducts joint exercises and training. In 2024, Chinese and Tanzanian troops participated in the “Pace Unity 2024” joint exercise, consisting of both land- and sea-based operations. Between 2018 and 2022, China accounted for almost 10 percent of all arms imports to Africa, behind Russia and the United States. As of 2024, 70 percent of African nations utilize Chinese armored vehicles in their militaries. China has especially benefited from Russia’s reduced military exports during the ongoing war in Ukraine by stepping in to provide reliable, affordable products to African militaries.

Russia’s Military Influence in Africa

Much like China, Russia has long sought to expand its influence across the African continent. Unable to match China’s economic might, Russia has exploited a Western vacuum, providing military support to juntas in the Sahel and elsewhere in exchange for access to the continent’s vast natural resources. Russia also conducts disinformation campaigns, spreading anti-Western narratives, and pro-Russian sentiment has helped Moscow forge close relationships with numerous African military leaders, diminishing American influence.

The Wagner Group, founded by the late Yevgeny Prigozhin and later reorganized into the Africa Corps, has been the primary force Moscow has used to advance its agenda in the region. In 2017, Wagner deployed to Sudan to provide security and train Sudanese troops to help suppress protesters in exchange for gold mining concessions to its subsidiary, Meroe Gold. A similar story has played out in the Central African Republic (CAR), where Wagner has assisted the CAR government in training soldiers, suppressing protests, conducting combat operations, and providing weapons and equipment in exchange for which it received mining rights.

However, in the Sahel, the Africa Corps has not achieved the same success. Recent efforts to combat insurgent groups in places such as Mali and Burkina Faso have been described as uncoordinated and ineffective. Indeed, many Sahel insurgent groups that the Africa Corps have battled are reviving. With the bulk of its forces, professional and paramilitary, fighting in Ukraine, Moscow may have hit the limit of its influence in Africa.

Still, Russia is likely to remain a major arms supplier. Between 2018 and 2022, 40 percent of African major arms imports came from Russia. During the same time frame, the United States and China accounted for 16 percentand around 10 percent of arms imports, respectively. While Russia’s number is sure to have decreased due to the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, the fact remains that Russian arms exports to African nations have forged strong political relationships and long-term military dependence on Moscow.

Moreover, Russian president Vladimir Putin has cultivated political ties with many African nations. Following the first-ever ministerial conference of the Russia-Africa Partnership Forum in late 2024, Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso signed a deal with Russia to monitor their borders using satellite imagery. With Moscow and Beijing pushing the BRICS expansion, two new African countries—Egypt and Ethiopia—have been inducted as full members, joining South Africa. Kenya and Zimbabwe have also expressed interest in joining. Algeria, Nigeria, and Uganda have been granted “partner country” status as of January 2025.

Will the US “Lose” Africa?

While Trump is admired for his strength in many African countries and has touted Africa’s economic potential, China has surpassed the United States in overall influence since 2013, encompassing all relations from diplomatic links to foreign aid and economic and security ties, according to the University of Denver’s Pardee Institute. The United States’ declining clout in Africa contrasts with its global influence in other regions. Europe’s post-colonial influence has also receded. The cutback in humanitarian and medical assistance is a blow to US influence in an area where the United States once stood out. China’s humanitarian foreign aid is relatively small.

The World Bank has warned that poorer developing countries, many in Africa, will face a hard slog in the next couple of decades, and it will take more than critical minerals mining deals to recover. Is it in the American and Western interest to see Africa decline further? Since 2020, Africa has seen more political unrest, violent extremism, and democratic reversals than any other region, and these trends could spill over into increased terrorism and migration. By default, turning Africa over to China and, to a lesser extent, Russia, the United States and the West are furthering the expansion of alternative governance institutions such as BRI and BRICS that Beijing and Moscow see as building blocks for a “non-” if not “anti-” Western world.

About the Authors: Mathew Burrows and Benjamin Weise

Mathew Burrows serves as counselor in the Executive Office at the Stimson Center, program lead of the center’s Strategic Foresight Hub, and co-author of the recent book World to Come: Return of Trump and End of the Old Order. Prior to joining Stimson, he was the director of foresight at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Strategy Initiative as well as the co-director of the New American Engagement Initiative.

Benjamin Weise is an intern with the Stimson Center’s Strategic Foresight Hub. He is a recent graduate of American University, where he received an MA in US Foreign Policy and National Security.