Geostrategic Media Political Commentary, Analysis, Security, Defense
The Indo-Pacific’s geostrategic landscape is changing faster than at any time since the Korean War. Although the U.S.–Japan and U.S.–ROK alliances have long been bound by bilateral defense pacts, Japan and South Korea lack a formal defense treaty, while the trilateral has its own distinctive national interests. Given the evolving security environment, the trilateral is facing serious threats.
Beijing’s accelerated arms buildup, coupled with its coercive maneuvers in and around the Taiwan Strait, is increasing the probability of drawing the U.S. and Japan into a major naval and air confrontation. At the same time, North Korea’s expanding nuclear and missile capabilities could trigger a near-simultaneous military attack or nuclear blackmail against South Korea. Such a dual-contingency scenario—an outbreak of all-out war in the Taiwan Strait and on the Korean Peninsula—would likely stretch the alliance’s logistics systems, fragment command structures, and expose the limitations of U.S. extended deterrence.
In addition, North Korea’s intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capability that can target the U.S. mainland is weakening the credibility of Washington’s commitment to retaliate on behalf of Seoul. Japan is also within range of North Korea’s and China’s hypersonic weapon systems. While the U.S. is redeploying its forces across two theaters, Tokyo and Seoul are questioning whether the U.S. could fight and sustain two major regional wars simultaneously.
In response, Washington, Tokyo, and Seoul strengthened their cooperation after the 2023 Camp David Summit, launching missile-warning data sharing, crisis-hotline mechanisms, and combined military exercises. Yet, regardless of such advancements, the trilateral remains vulnerable; it heavily relies on U.S. leadership, is constrained by mutual suspicion—especially between Japan and South Korea—and lacks a standing institution.
History offers a notable analogy. Roughly half a century ago, three countries—Egypt, Libya, and Syria—attempted to bind themselves into a single unified defense and political union: the Federation of Arab Republics (FAR). Despite different geographical and ideological contexts, the rise and fall of the federation clearly demonstrate what the trilateral in East Asia should avoid.
Leadership, Institutions, and the Lessons of the Federation
The federation, formed by President Anwar Sadat in 1972, intended to inherit the pan-Arab dreams propagated by Egypt’s leader Gamal Abdel Nasser. It promised a unified foreign policy, integrated defense planning, and ultimately a political union among Egypt, Libya, and Syria. On paper, the FAR looked ambitious. It envisioned a unified military command, a joint presidential council, and coordinated economic policies. Nevertheless, it collapsed within five years.
The crucial reason was structural. Although Egypt dominated militarily and diplomatically, its partners distrusted Cairo’s intentions. Libya’s Muammar Gaddafi was discontented with Egyptian control, while Syria’s Hafez al-Assad feared dependence. The lack of equal decision-making, durable institutions, and shared threat perception reduced the federation to a symbolic entity. When Egypt signed the Camp David Accords in 1978, it made the already hollowed-out project completely defunct.
The failure of the FAR provides an immediate warning to the U.S.–Japan–ROK framework. Washington is considered indispensable yet occasionally distrusted, just like Cairo. Japan and South Korea rely on the U.S. for deterrence, yet fear overreliance on the U.S. and shifting American priorities. To avoid such imbalance, the three countries should adopt polycentric leadership: the U.S. leading in extended deterrence and strategic lift, Japan being deeply involved in logistics and resilience, and South Korea centering its focus on missile defense and drone-warfare capability.
Such a model should be strengthened not by summit diplomacy but by institutional permanence. A Trilateral Security Secretariat, based in Tokyo or Seoul and staffed by military and civilian personnel, could be created. In addition, the establishment of a Combined Intelligence Fusion Center—which integrates missile-warning, space, and maritime data—would turn cooperation into tangible capability. By implementing an annual dual-contingency command-post joint exercise, the allies could test their ability to respond to simultaneous crises in Taiwan and on the Korean Peninsula. Only institutionalized equality can replace asymmetric dependence and leadership fragility.
Strategic Flexibility and Shared Threat Perception
Another reason why the federation collapsed was ideological rigidity. Defined by anti-Israel and anti-Western sentiment, it lacked practical objectives and isolated potential partners. If today’s trilateral cooperation identifies itself only as an opposing axis to China and North Korea, it could fall into a similar trap. A purely oppositional posture would narrow diplomatic flexibility and deepen polarization in the region.
Instead, the trilateral should explicitly articulate positive objectives—centering on freedom of navigation, humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief—anchored in a rules-based order, and define itself as a Pacific Stability Partnership. By expanding cooperation with ASEAN and Pacific Island nations through capability-building programs and publishing an annual Trilateral Human-Security Report, the trilateral could project an image of cooperation rather than confrontation.
Likewise, as disagreements among FAR member states over how to deal with Israel eventually precipitated the collapse of the federation, trilateral cooperation would falter if Japan primarily focuses on China and South Korea on North Korea. For strategic alignment, the three countries should establish a Joint Strategic Planning Board to create a common scenario integrating military operations in the Taiwan Strait and on the Korean Peninsula. Furthermore, overlap among U.S. assets under USFJ and USFK should be minimized through the establishment of an inter-theater logistics map. By introducing an interoperability index that measures progress in missile defense, electronic warfare, and cyber resilience, rhetorical alignment would match actual readiness.
Economic Basis and Domestic Legitimacy
FAR also failed due to the lack of an economic base. Egypt’s population and Libya’s oil wealth were not merged into a coherent market, leaving few structural incentives to maintain unity. Through security cooperation based on industrial and technological integration, the trilateral should overcome such fragility.
In that context, a Trilateral Defense-Industry Council could be established to incentivize joint development of systems including offshore patrol vessels (OPVs), counter-UAS, and electronic-warfare (EW) aircraft. In addition, the trilateral could make cooperation durable by securing supply chains—including semiconductors, batteries, and rare earths—that are necessary for arms production. Harmonizing export-control systems would enable joint production while safeguarding dual-use technology.
Domestic legitimacy is equally important. Gaddafi’s radicalism, Sadat’s diplomacy, and Assad’s cautiousness doomed the FAR since state politics overwhelmed the common objective. Today, similar dynamics exist. Japan’s constitutional constraints, South Korea’s ideological divisions, and uncertainty originating from the U.S. election cycle could all weaken momentum. To alleviate such risks, the trilateral should explicitly codify crisis-consultation mechanisms in their respective domestic laws and institutionalize regular legislative briefings among the U.S. Congress, Japan’s Diet, and South Korea’s National Assembly. Furthermore, the three countries need to ensure that their publics fully and continuously understand the purpose of trilateral cooperation through public-diplomacy campaigns underscoring technology, trade, and humanitarian contributions.
Toward a Resilient Trilateral Architecture
The FAR was unsuccessful because it attempted integration without the necessary step—institutionalization—that should have been taken. The U.S.–Japan–ROK framework faces the opposite type of risk: institutionalizing more slowly than threats are converging. Although the Indo-Pacific does not necessitate a supranational union, credible interdependence is a sine qua non: a system that can distribute leadership, consolidate bureaucracies, and incentivize planning against a dual contingency.
The key lesson of the 1970s Arab world is not that unity is impossible, but rather that a coalition without solid structure and equity would not be durable.
