Geostrategic Media Political Commentary, Analysis, Security, Defense
The Return of Strategic Uncertainty
The Middle East has returned to center stage in US foreign policy. Donald Trump’s return to politics has already been preceded by spectacle, bombastic language, and real shifts in US military deployments. To Washington, the Gulf is geopolitically irreplaceable: it offers nearly half of the world’s oil reserves and over 40% of natural gas reserves, and is the geographical pivot between Asia, Europe, and Africa. It is important to Trump to ensure American primacy in the region in order to avoid allowing China, Russia, or Iran from filling any vacuum. Trump’s dramatic and surprising approach to diplomacy is always a cover for deeper strategic moves. His announcement of an upcoming “Middle East event that will change everything” is little more than kabuki, but experience tells us such threatcasts are harbingers of actual American policy shifts in the region. As Iran mobilizes soldiers, China burrows into Gulf digital and oil infrastructure, and Russia reinforces its leadership in OPEC+, the Gulf is being reshaped as the focal battlefield of 21st-century geopolitics.
Trump’s Gulf Strategy: Energy, Alliances, and Symbolism
American grand strategy in the Gulf has long been tied to two imperatives: protecting energy supplies and gaining a balance of power in its favor. While Washington’s dependence on Gulf oil has declined with the growth of shale production, the international economy remains addicted: 20% of all seaborne petroleum still passes through the Strait of Hormuz daily. A single interruption there would raise world oil prices by 20–30% in a matter of days.
Trump’s latest gestures towards the Gulf rulers—spoken in conciliatory tones and symbolic regrets—need to be understood less as theatrics and more in the context of insurance. By reasserting ties with Riyadh, Abu Dhabi, and Doha, Washington desires to preclude these capitals from receding further into Beijing’s economic sphere or Moscow’s energy arc. Symbolism is strategy in a multipolar world. Gestures are designed to limit hedging by Gulf monarchies and reassert the perception that the U.S. remains the indispensable security partner.
Between 2015 and 2022, the Gulf purchased more than $65 billion of U.S. arms, ranking second as a regional buyer of U.S. defense exports following Asia. Purchases have consisted of Patriot and THAAD missile defense systems, precision-guided bombs, and deals to sell the F-35 to the UAE. For Trump, the expansion of this defense-industrial partnership is not only a security issue but also a way of ensuring Gulf oil revenues are reinvested in U.S. industry, preserving the structural dependency of Gulf states on Washington.
Iran’s Shadow: Nuclear Ambiguities and Missile Proliferation
No matter how Trump fashion Gulf diplomacy, Iran is the unavoidable hub of U.S. military planning. Tehran has massively invested in an asymmetric strategy to discourage U.S. or Israeli strikes. Its missile force of over 3,000 ballistic and cruise missiles offers the largest and most diverse missile arsenal in the Middle East. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has relocated warheads to underground bunkers dug hundreds of meters below the earth, making them entirely immune to conventional attack.
Leaked U.S. intelligence in late 2024 showed Iranian soldiers moving warheads under what officials called “missile head relocation.” Tehran also began the largest mobilization of reservists since the 1980s Iran–Iraq War. This is a copy of previous escalation cycles: before the 2019 U.S. bombing of Iranian-affiliated centers in Iraq, the same dispersal and mobilization patterns occurred.
The nuclear dimension is equally uncertain. Despite the collapse of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), Iran has continued to enrich uranium to levels close to weapons grade. Reports from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) indicate stockpiles of enriched uranium at over 60%—enough to produce several nuclear warheads in a few months if weaponized. For Washington, these developments call for an attitude of readiness.
That makes the recent deployment of KC-135 and KC-46 air-to-air refueling tankers to Al-Udeid Air Base in Qatar particularly significant. The tankers are a vital part of long-range strike missions, enabling U.S. bombers and fighter aircraft to push deep into Iranian airspace. Historically, their deployment to the Gulf has preceded large-scale military efforts, ranging from the 2003 invasion of Iraq to covert strikes on Iranian targets.
China’s Expanding Gulf Presence
The Gulf is no longer merely an oil producer—it’s a testing ground for Beijing’s energy-tech convergence diplomacy. China is the top trading partner of the majority of GCC countries, importing nearly 1.8 million barrels of crude per day from Saudi Arabia alone. Apart from hydrocarbons, Beijing is becoming part of Gulf tech hubs. Huawei has also spearheaded 5G launches in Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar, while Chinese players are also at the forefront of developing smart cities like Saudi Arabia’s NEOM and Qatar’s Lusail.
Saudi Arabia’s $8.4 billion NEOM green hydrogen facility is a prime example of the crossroads: it relies more than anything on Chinese electrolyzer equipment and monitoring equipment. The UAE, in its turn, has beckoned the Stargate campus for artificial intelligence, hailed as the world’s largest AI infrastructure hub outside the U.S., with Emirati firm G42 partnering with American and Chinese firms. This doubleness reflects the hedging of the GCC: seeking to benefit from Chinese innovation without losing ties with American firms like Microsoft, Oracle, and Nvidia.
To Beijing, the Gulf is not just a matter of resources but more of an experiment ground for building influence in the era of digital technology. In dominating strategic infrastructures like 5G, data centers, and smart grids, China guarantees possible access to sensitive energy and consumption data, thus giving it strategic leverage. This reflects the concept of technopolitics, where technology is used as a tool of extension of power and not a neutral medium.
Russia and the OPEC+ Factor
Whereas China dominates the tech pillar, Russia dominates through influence using oil markets. Since 2016, OPEC+, or OPEC members in addition to Russia, has allowed Moscow to align with Riyadh. In 2023, Saudi Arabia led a voluntary cut of one million barrels per day to calm the markets, basically pushing the interests of Russia under Western sanctions. This alignment has protected Moscow from some economic shock of sanctions related to Ukraine, while giving Riyadh leverage on Washington.
Trump’s Gulf policy cannot escape this triangle. America is finding it difficult to deter closer coming together of Gulf capitals, Moscow, and Beijing as all three powers take advantage of Washington’s declining zeal to still be the sole guarantor of Gulf security.
Military Indicators: Preparing for Escalation
The scale of recent U.S. military deployments underlines the seriousness of the situation. The deployment of KC-135 and KC-46 aerial refueling tankers to Qatar coincides with the rotation of a carrier strike group in the Arabian Sea. The U.S. already has over 35,000 troops based at Gulf bases, 10,000 based at Al-Udeid in Qatar, 7,000 in Bahrain (where the Fifth Fleet is stationed), and thousands in the UAE, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia.
European missions have quietly instructed their diplomats in Gulf states to prepare evacuation measures, recalling 2003 pre-war advice. Leaked intelligence reveals that the Pentagon organized a closed-door high-level military meeting in Virginia, with nearly 300 top brass attending. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth purportedly declared: “The era of defense is over; the Pentagon’s mission is expansion of combat missions.” Rhetoric can go ahead of reality, but the quotes above reveal the atmosphere of looming war.
Trump’s cryptic promise of a revolutionary Middle East “event” calls to mind his 2019 style, on the eve of furtive strikes against Iranian nuclear sites. In this context, recent moves point not to routine exercises but to preparation for coercive signaling or even limited strikes.
Policy Implications for the Gulf States
For the leaders in the Gulf, the strategic environment is more and more perilous. Their economies are dependent on Chinese markets, their digital futures on Chinese technology, and their security on U.S. military assurances. This triple dependence is vulnerable to being exploited by enemies.
Gaps in the governance undermine the credibility of the Gulf in global markets initially. Diversified carbon regimes—multiple monitoring, reporting, and verification (MRV) systems in every country—cut the GCC short of having full access to international carbon markets such as the EU’s Emissions Trading System. Without regional harmonization, carbon credits from the Gulf are not credible.
Second, dependency risks are increasing. Over-reliance on Chinese data centers and Huawei 5G jeopardizes exposing energy and consumption data to foreign leverage. Concurrently, over-dependency on the U.S. defense missile system forces Gulf sovereignty to stay harmonized with American decision-making. This two-way dependency creates strategic vulnerability.
Third, there are security spillovers. Saudi Arabia’s $500 billion NEOM smart city and the UAE’s Stargate AI hub are no longer just economic investments—now they are potential targets and geopolitical bargaining chips. Washington and Beijing consider them battlegrounds to secure influence.
Hence, there are three strategies exist for Gulf leaders:
Balancing – Maintaining relationships with both U.S. and China, taking economic and security benefits from each without being totally committed to either.
Institutionalization – Creating GCC-level institutions for carbon governance, cybersecurity, and collective defense in order to reduce exposure.
Strategic Autonomy – Building domestic capabilities in AI, hydrogen, and defense in order to reduce reliance, though this is long-term.
Conclusion: Towards a New Gulf Order
Trump’s Middle East gambit is both spectacle and substance. His public displays of deference toward Gulf allies, deployments of troops, and speeches about historic moments all point to a policy of reasserting American leadership in a multipolar world. But the world he is confronting is not the Gulf of the 1990s. It is a Gulf in which China builds 5G infrastructure, Russia governs the oil market, and Iran has the largest missile force in the Middle East.
The stakes are high. A misjudgment could unleash a U.S.–Iran war with domino effects on global energy markets. In the meantime, Gulf states’ attempts at hedging between Washington and Beijing will become increasingly impossible.
Lastly, the Gulf is not an inanimate platform of great power rivalry anymore. Its choices—whether to align, hedge, or pursue autonomy—will shape not only regional stability but also the future contours of global energy and technology governance. To that extent, Trump’s gamble could quite possibly “change everything,” but whether it stabilizes or destabilizes the Middle East will depend no less on Gulf agency than on U.S. willpower.
