Geostrategic Media Political Commentary, Analysis, Security, Defense
For the first time in the history of the Federal Republic of Germany, the Bundeswehr (German Armed Forces), could fully realize its operational and strategic potential.
The €100 billion ($113.4 billion) special fund for the Bundeswehr — approved in the aftermath of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, an event that took many by surprise — has opened up the possibility of comprehensive procurement of equipment and information technology as early as 2022. The money has now largely been utilized, but much of it has yet to reach the areas where it is most urgently needed. Only €24 billion have actually been spent.
With the decision recently announced by the incoming coalition partners, it would even be possible to increase the German defense budget by 3% of gross national product to €132 billion. However, the change in mentality that was aimed for in 2022 with the announcement of the turnaround has largely failed to materialize. Only on the issue of military aid for Ukraine has there been a comprehensive change of course in Germany in the last three years. Yet, the realignment of the Bundeswehr’s capabilities in response to the evolving security landscape remains hindered by persistent problems in procurement and serious deficiencies in civilian and military command structures. These challenges stem primarily from inadequate political leadership and a lack of strategic direction.
Examples of this are the defense policy guidelines adopted in 2023, which brought the concept of war capability into the debate, but failed to initiate a strategic realignment of the Bundeswehr. It will therefore be one of the priority tasks of the next federal government to define the strategic framework of requirements and to adapt the Bundeswehr to the new circumstances in terms of its equipment, its size, its capabilities and also its form of defense.
The requirements of the NATO Defense Planning Process are decisive for the realignment of the German Armed Forces. The forthcoming decisions in the North Atlantic Alliance on these requirements will also have to change the capability profile and possibly the size of the armed forces.
The current turbulence in the transatlantic relationship may prove decisive in this respect. The EU has reaffirmed its willingness to rearm on a large scale at all European councils and meetings in recent weeks. Of course, declarations of intent cannot replace political structural decisions.
EU’s ambitions and snapback to reality
EU member states must decide whether they aim to form a European pillar within NATO — a vision whose viability is uncertain under current US leadership — or to build a standalone European defense community. In its current state, the EU is unsuitable for the latter. It has no politico-military goal definition. Nor does it have European military headquarters comparable to Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) nor a comprehensive planning and command structure for joint military operations. It is still dependent on the operational headquarters and deployable field headquarters of the member states, only very few of which have comprehensive military capabilities.
The bottlenecks become clear when planning any civil-military or military operation under the responsibility of the EU, for example when it comes to deployable field hospitals, long-distance air transport or the ability to conduct evacuation operations using special forces, deployable field hospitals and a large-scale maritime rearmament.
When calls are made today to strengthen the military role of the EU, the issue of political-military decision-making processes is usually neglected. The unification of the EU member states, which are so different in terms of their political cultures, historical traditions and objectives, will take longer than Europe can afford given the current international situation. There is also the issue of military procurement, the question of adapting general staff training and a common understanding of robust rules of engagement in the national parliaments.
Even the Bundeswehr is not yet fully prepared for a corresponding European leadership role. Symptomatic of the deficits is the agonizingly slow debate on a European drone that has been going on for 10 years, also due to the involvement of the German Bundestag (lower house of parliament) at the request of the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) parliamentary group. The troubled development of the A400M and the controversial decision to purchase the F-35 without a coherent strategic vision illustrate further systemic flaws. With US President Donald Trump’s recent political resurgence, even this acquisition is under renewed scrutiny before the aircraft have arrived.
Obligation versus voluntarism
Even during the coalition negotiations, it is foreseeable that the two coalition partners will be divided on the issue of the form of defense. The SPD insists on the model presented by Pistorius of compulsory military service based on the principle of voluntariness. The CDU/CSU in particular has spoken out in favor of reviving general conscription. Compulsory military service was not abolished in 2010, but only the call-up for basic military service was suspended. This was in line with the understanding at the time that a changing security policy situation would allow the suspension to be canceled at any time with a simple legal regulation (consent law). The current global political turmoil, in particular the real threat posed by Putin’s Russia and the foreseeable problems of zones of differing security that will arise in a post-Ukraine war scenario, suggest that this moment has now arrived.
For a very long time, the CDU (unlike its little sister, the CSU) has been very cautious about the unpopular issue of compulsory military service. Instead, the proposal of general compulsory service was repeatedly taken up in resolutions and election programmed. These contradictions mean that it would be logical not only to withdraw the suspension of conscription for basic military service, but also to justify general compulsory service for men and women in connection with the possible revitalization of general compulsory military service. However, this would require a two-thirds majority in both the Bundestag and the Bundesrat (upper house of the parliament). In the current political constellation, this seems unlikely. If the new government opts for the model of compulsory military service favored by Acting Defense Minister Pistorius, it can also be assumed in all likelihood that the Federal Constitutional Court in Karlsruhe would overturn this solution, which conflicts with the provisions of the Basic Law.
The Bundeswehr’s future capabilities must be defined through a binding strategic analysis, aligned with NATO and EU requirements. This assessment must take into account not only the prevailing threat from Russia but also the need for readiness across multiple scenarios. But this cannot be the only yardstick. Defense must always be geared towards multiple scenarios and multiple threats at the same time. In the battle of connected weapons, the following are particularly called for: a significant increase in combat platforms, a technology-driven defense strategy that invests in combat drones so that precise enemy platforms and systems can be eliminated; the networking of artificial intelligence, sensors and the consistent use of satellite communication and satellite reconnaissance in combat and counter-combat; the strengthening of cyber capabilities, as well as a reassessment of maritime warfare; the increase in the number of supply and command ships. The Bundeswehr has a lot of catching up to do, especially in air and naval warfare.
When the North Atlantic Alliance defines the requirements for the NATO planning process in summer 2025, this will require a further increase in the need to adapt the armed forces’ capabilities. France, with 17% of defense imports from the US, is far ahead of the EU median of 70%, but this is the direction we are heading in. The abolition of the civilian clause, which provides for a strict separation of civilian and military research, is one of the obvious consequences. The aim must be to catch up as quickly as possible with the military utilization of the OneWeb civilian satellite constellation in aerospace, i.e. with launchers and mini-missiles, and for example with a comprehensive control and steering situation on the ground. The geostationary communications satellites that are already being built today can certainly stand comparison. Of course, the difficulties with IRIS-T epitomize the problems of European coordination, just as the problems with Future Combat Air System (FCAS) also have to do with national sensitivities. In most areas, Europe has so far been too fragmented as a global competitor. The planned space joint venture between Leonardo and Thales could offer a perspective here.
Public perception of army
Germany’s stagnation in security policy is largely due to entrenched departmentalism and poor coordination between the Federal Foreign Office and the Defense Ministry, which is often treated as merely an implementation agency. This Federal Government is unlikely to come up with the big idea of a National Security Council, at best an upgrading of the existing Federal Security Council. The power-conscious smaller partner, the SPD, is primarily concerned with scoring points in the tug of war within the future coalition and is successfully negating the will of the electorate actual size ratio.
German society has had a difficult relationship with the military for decades. The reasons for this go way back to the early days of the Federal Republic and have a lot to do with the legacy of the National Socialist era and the misuse of the military. The attractiveness of the armed forces also has a lot to do with how the service is recognized by the state and society. Here, too, policymakers in Germany still face a major task. In the more than 30 years since reunification, the Germans have cultivated a political culture that favors compromises, half solutions and postponed fundamental issues. The strategic situation in 2025 does not allow this practice to continue. Germany must change its political culture and rethink its business model if it wants to continue to play a leading role in the world of globalization. The success of the next federal government—under Chancellor Friedrich Merz—will largely depend on how it redefines the Bundeswehr’s role within European, transatlantic, and global frameworks.
* Opinions expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Anadolu’s editorial policy.
