Geostrategic Media Political Commentary, Analysis, Security, Defense
The recent indirect negotiations between Iran and the United States in Muscat, Oman, mediated by the Omani government, hold significant dimensions and importance from the perspective of international relations and strategic diplomacy theories.
These discussions unfold amidst a global order marked by fundamental rifts, where multifaceted geopolitical, economic, and technological variables, alongside shifts in international regimes, increasingly influence states’ foreign policy.
Since the Trump administration’s unilateral withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2018, relations between Iran and the United States have entered a phase of chronic confrontation. Trump’s “maximum pressure” policy, aimed at weakening the Iranian economy, altered Tehran’s behavior in some areas while leaving it unchanged in others, prompting Iran to transition from outright and comprehensive resistance to intelligent and targeted resistance.
The Biden administration assumed power on a platform to return to the JCPOA. However, in practice, it encountered domestic political barriers in the United States, regional pressures, and political infighting among factions in Iran. Now, in 2025, with a decisive Republican administration in the White House and Republican control of both the Senate and the House of Representatives, the instability in American domestic policy has diminished, and regional pressures have transformed into regional support. Consequently, the US government is striving, as much as possible through diplomacy, to prevent Iran’s nuclear program from becoming an unnecessary crisis in the Middle East—a crisis that could escalate to the point of no return through military confrontation or the expansion of Iran’s nuclear activities. In such circumstances, the necessity for negotiation and a renewed understanding of both sides’ protracted, needless conflict is amplified, leading them to the negotiating table in Oman to seek a resolution.
The Oman talks once again showcased a model of “indirect diplomacy,” a pattern that, due to deep political divisions and the lack of mutual recognition of legitimacy, has effectively become an institutionalized format in Tehran-Washington relations.
The Omani government’s role as an honest broker reflects a type of “Track I.5 diplomacy,” employing official and unofficial elements to de-escalate tensions. This format indicates the level of mistrust between the parties and demonstrates that dialogue remains a necessary, albeit insufficient, tool in managing geostrategic confrontations. Game theory analysts might analyze such negotiations within a “variable-sum game” model, where a concession by one side does not necessarily equate to a loss for the other but can lead to a redistribution of interests.
The primary focus of the recent negotiations was on the issue of uranium enrichment in Iran and the feasibility of importing nuclear fuel. The United States proposed that Iran halt its enrichment program and secure its fuel needs through imports. Strategically, this proposal is reminiscent of the “external control of sensitive technology” model, previously applied to countries like South Korea and Argentina. Conversely, while rejecting this proposal, Iran emphasized its sovereign right to enrichment, deeming it legitimate under the supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency. This stance by Iran should be analyzed within the framework of a “nuclear balancing strategy.” Conventional deterrence theory and Buzan and Waever’s model of “identity-based securitization” can provide a suitable analytical framework for understanding Tehran’s insistence on this right, where nuclear technology is perceived not merely as a tool of power but as a component of international standing and the political identity of Iran.
To understand the United States’ behavior in the recent negotiations, it is necessary to consider the nexus between the strategy of containment and crisis management. The United States, currently realigning its resources to confront larger rivalries in East Asia, seeks to avoid entanglement in a costly crisis with Iran. The Biden administration and its foreign policy team, having sought to establish a more cost-effective order after the withdrawal from Afghanistan and the gradual reduction of its presence in the Middle East, aimed in the 2020 and 2021 Oman talks more to buy time and stabilize a “non-explosive” situation than to achieve a final agreement. However, the current US administration views resolving the nuclear issue with Iran as a way to realign its resources to address larger rivalries in East Asia, hence its strong insistence on a permanent resolution.
From the perspective of defensive realism theories, the United States under the Biden administration was pursuing a form of “offshore balancing”—reducing the costs of direct intervention and transferring the burden of regional security to allies. Within this framework, preventing Iran from crossing the nuclear threshold without engaging in war or accepting a major strategic concession was America’s primary priority. Iran, fully aware of the domestic and international context of the United States and regional conditions, seeks to solidify its position as an independent and capable actor in the regional order. Iran’s strategy can be seen as a form of “playing with time and room for maneuver”: any progress in negotiations should not lead to the weakening of indigenous nuclear technology or a strategic compromise with the United States. From the “targeted resistance” theory perspective, Iran is attempting to create a position of advantage in negotiations by combining diplomacy and nuclear capability without engaging in direct conflict.
The Oman negotiations cannot be analyzed solely within the framework of bilateral Iran-US relations. These talks reflect profound changes in the structure of the West Asian regional order, reshaped by the gradual US withdrawal, the Abraham Accords, the rise of Saudi Arabia and Turkey in regional equations, tensions in the Red Sea, direct US involvement, and conflict with the Houthis in the Middle East after October 7th, and escalating Iran-Israel rivalries.
Furthermore, Europe’s apparent neutrality in the third round of negotiations signals a relative collapse of the Western consensus regarding the Iran issue. Simultaneously, Russia and China are strengthening their strategic relations with Tehran, ostensibly providing Iran with greater bargaining power—though significant discussions regarding the extent and implications of this enhanced leverage remain to be addressed. These developments align with the theory of “regional multipolarity,” where middle powers such as Iran, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Israel become decisive actors. At the level of international regimes, the recent negotiations indicate that the non-proliferation regime faces a crisis of legitimacy. Although the International Atomic Energy Agency remains the supervisory authority, the failure of world powers to provide sustainable incentives and respect prior commitments (such as sanctions relief) has led many countries, including Iran, to perceive this regime as ineffective and unfair.
Based on current data and the trend of discussions, three broad scenarios for the future of negotiations can be envisioned:
a) Interim Agreement: In this scenario, the two sides agree on a limited suspension of nuclear activities in exchange for releasing a portion of Iran’s blocked assets or reducing specific sanctions. This model is similar to the 2013 Joint Plan of Action and could reduce tensions without fundamentally resolving the differences. The advantage of such an agreement is preventing the escalation of the crisis; its weakness lies in its fragility and the possibility of rapid violation by either side.
b) Continuation of the Status Quo: In this path, negotiations continue without tangible results, but neither side fully withdraws from the negotiating table. Tensions are managed, but the structure of sanctions and nuclear activities remains at their current levels. The advantage of this scenario is maintaining short-term crisis control. However, its weakness is the erosion of trust, the weakening of international institutions, and increased long-term risk.
c) Failure of Negotiations and a New Crisis: The parties conclude that negotiation is no longer effective, and Iran accelerates its nuclear program. This scenario increases the likelihood of a military response from Israel or the intensification of international sanctions. In this scenario, the US might conclude that Iran is not seeking negotiation but rather wasting time, potentially leading the US to resort to force to resolve the crisis. The advantage of such a situation is the clarification of each side’s strategic positions; its weakness is the sharp increase in the risk of war, the escalation of regional crises, and a threat to Iran’s existence.
Beyond a bilateral dialogue, the recent negotiations between Iran and the United States reflect the critical state of the post-Cold War international order—an order facing weakened multilateralism, the resurgence of great power competition, and a crisis of legitimacy for international institutions. In such a context, Iran’s nuclear diplomacy must be understood not only as a security crisis but also as a symbol of the intertwining of diplomacy, geopolitics, technology, and meaning in world politics. From the perspective of professional diplomacy, these negotiations are an opportunity to rethink the concept of “common security” and redefine the role of middle powers in shaping regional arrangements. Although reaching a final agreement in the short term is fraught with complexities, maintaining this path of negotiation, even with minimal achievements, can prevent the premature explosion of the crisis and perhaps lay the groundwork for deeper discussions in the future order. Therefore, any protracted negotiation or any temporary agreement would disregard the realities of today’s world and the new conditions of the region and would not only fail to resolve problems but would also deepen Iran’s internal and external crises.
