Geostrategic Media Political Commentary, Analysis, Security, Defense
Syria’s Transition: The Media Sideshow
The lightning rod offensive that toppled the regime of Bashar al-Assad invoked memories of the trajectories that manifested when dictators were ousted in Iraq in 2003, and rebellious countries joined the Arab Spring in 2011. Despite severed diplomatic relations and no government-to-government contact, dozens of Western news agencies and journalists descended on Syria overnight to witness firsthand the throngs of protesters demonstrating and jubilant citizens toppling symbols of the al-Assad regime. The safe passage given to Western journalists and dignitaries contrasted starkly with the treatment of millions of exiled Syrians, who were ostracized by both the despotic al-Assad regime and Hayaat Tahrir al-Sham militants ruling Northwest Syria with an iron fist.
From Washington to London and Paris to Berlin, Western news outlets are painting a rosy picture of the remnants of al-Qaeda, the Muslim Brotherhood, and Islamic State building a pluralistic and vibrant liberal democracy. In some instances, journalists like CNN’s Clarissa Ward have gone as far as staging the “liberation” of prisoners from the notorious Sadnaya prison to play up the “humanitarian frame” and narrative surrounding the liberation of once-shackled Syrians. Thus far, Abu Mohammed al-Jolani, now referred to as Ahmad al-Sharaa, the face of the state-building project in Syria who swapped his jihadist garb for a Zelensky-like shirt and sports jacket, is saying all the right things to convince the world that takfiri extremists are committed to liberalizing Syria. Syria’s post-Assad transition is being shaped by a convergence of competing geopolitical agendas, opportunistic alliances, and the precarious ambitions of its new Islamist leadership—making stability a far more complex and fragile prospect than its architects or supporters claim.
The United States: The Ultimate Kingmaker
Following the botched war on terror and the unraveling of the region, the U.S. has shifted from a once nuanced grand strategy to a piecemeal and reactionary policy that depends on a combination of brute force and economic coercion to impose American interests in the region. The Biden administration has largely stuck to traditional Democratic talking points, expressing optimism while asserting that the new government must meet strict benchmarks to earn recognition from the U.S. Washington’s sudden embrace of a proscribed terrorist organization and one specially designated terrorist is not merely grounded in realpolitik or facts on the ground. Rather, America’s pivot to H.T.S. is foremost an admission that the unofficial policy of working with Shiite extremists to counter Sunni fundamentalists is officially dead.
In an interview with Al Jazeera, Paul Bremer, Iraq’s first civilian leader in the post-Saddam Hussein era, explained that the U.S. overthrew President Hussein because supporting Shiites was the “least bad solution”. From 2003 onwards, the U.S. operated either in lockstep or covertly with Iran and Iran-backed groups in the Middle East to confront Sunni jihadism. The assassination of Qasem Soleimani in 2020 signified the rapid unraveling of the U.S.–Shiite alliance and wider efforts to marginalize the Sunnis, whom the U.S. blamed for fomenting the illiberal ideals that culminated in the 9/11 attacks.
H.T.S’ indifference towards Israel’s destruction of Syria’s military and naval capacities, while penetrating deep into Syrian territory, signals to Washington that the reformed Syrian jihadists have one primary purpose: gaining international recognition and carving out a de facto demilitarized state that lacks the capacity to confront Israel or any other power that wishes to destabilize Syria. Under this arrangement, H.T.S. expects the U.S. and its allies to provide the new Syrian government with enough assistance to keep the embattled regime up and running. In the grand scheme, Washington’s tilt to Sunni jihadists who lack both the legitimacy and experience to rule could align with its envisaged goal of transforming the Middle East into a bulwark against encroaching Chinese influence. Iran’s 25-year strategic partnership with China and Iraq’s burgeoning ties with Beijing signal to Washington that when competition with China heats up, the West can count on Sunni jihadists to act as the first line of defense against Chinese expansion into the Arab world.
Israel: Washington’s Whisperer and co-Kingmaker
Since Hamas’ October 7 attack, the U.S. has given Israel carte blanche to reshape the region to its own liking. In the wake of Israel’s controversial land grabs in southern Syria that displaced thousands of residents, many of them minorities, from their ancestral homes, the Biden administration framed the incursions—which violate the 1974 disengagement agreement—as a defensive measure that satisfies Israel’s right to defend itself against a potentially hostile regime. While Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has expressed interest in forging ties with Syria’s new government, the increasingly militaristic and fundamentalist Israeli establishment prefers expanding its geopolitical footprint at the expense of weak regimes.
Israel’s “wait and see” policy posits that any unfavorable shift in Damascus could warrant a new offensive and greater seizure of Syrian territory. Al-Sharaa’s mute response to Israel’s incursions and displacement of Syrian citizens outside the 1974 buffer zone embodies H.T.S. essentially adopting al-Assad’s policy of turning a blind eye to Israeli aggression if doing so keeps them in office. Israel’s aggressive posturing will not stop at incursions, airstrikes against weapon systems, or creating new facts on the ground. Behind the scenes, Netanyahu or any other Israeli leader will compel Washington to deepen its relationship with the Syrian Democratic Forces (S.D.F.) and potentially coerce H.T.S. into accepting an autonomous or semi-autonomous republic in Northeast Syria with no prospects of full integration with Damascus. The extraordinary weakness of Syria’s new government increases the likelihood of H.T.S. acquiescing to Israel’s demands to maintain support from Western capitals.
Turkey: Not the ‘Protector’ of the Future Damascus Government
President-elect Trump and Western news outlets have portrayed Turkey as the biggest winner in Syria. At face value, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the driving force behind the post-Arab Spring insurgency, scored a major victory when the rebels took Damascus. Turkey’s stake cannot be understated given its porous border with Syria, the sheer size and power of the Turkish military, the presence of Turkish bases inside Northwest Syria, and the robust cooperation between multiple rebel factions and Ankara. As positive as these developments might seem for Turkey, the seismic shifts cannot be interpreted as purely the work of Erdogan, given the Turkish government proscribing H.T.S. as a terrorist organization and the Syrian National Army, a Turkish proxy, playing a minimal role in spearheading the recent offensive. Al-Sharaa’s statements about H.T.S. launching the offensive to prevent the “partition” of Syria overlap with the presumption that, for months, Turkey attempted to normalize relations with Syria to achieve agreements that would facilitate the swift repatriation of millions of Syrian refugees and a multilateral Syrian-Turkish-Iranian-Russian operation to severely weaken the SDF. If Turkey and the al-Assad regime normalized relations and reached mutual understandings on the refugee issue and countering the S.D.F., it is highly plausible that Turkey would have scaled down support for its proxies, hence giving the al-Assad regime an impetus to retake territories held by H.T.S. and their allies.
Turkey, currently in the throes of a severe economic crisis, is in no position to adopt the Damascus government as doing so would require huge financial support that Turkey cannot provide. The only plausible lifeline Turkey can secure if it wishes to bankroll Damascus—financial aid from Gulf states—is far-fetched because Gulf states, wary of supporting groups that could go rogue, are unlikely to pledge reconstruction aid for Syria unless it comes in the context of an international agreement endorsed by the great powers. With European capitals, China, and Russia also reeling from financial turmoil, no single bloc or power has the appetite to foot the bill for a $400 billion reconstruction program that could be easily upended by infighting among the various factions on the ground.
In the short term, Turkey is prioritizing several main goals, including the repatriation of a sizable number of Syrian refugees and a permanent, durable agreement with Washington that would neutralize or severely curtail the influence of armed Kurdish groups in the Northeast. President Erdogan’s remarks regarding a potential defense agreement with Damascus coincide with the reality that Ankara sat by idly as Israel breached the buffer zone in occupied territory in Syria. Recent bipartisan congressional calls to heavily sanction Turkey if it moves against the S.D.F. are a warning that Turkey will likely heed because any Western embargo could torpedo the already spiraling Turkish economy.
The Kurdish Factor: A Marxist Republic in Northeast Syria
Regardless of the performance of the new Syrian government, the U.S. under a Democratic or Republican administration will not easily disarm the S.D.F. or hand over oil refineries and wheat fields to Syrian rulers, depriving them of a desperately needed financial lifeline. Trump’s longstanding desire to disengage from Syria could hit a brick wall due to pushback from bipartisan congressional leaders who demand continued support for the S.D.F., as well as Israeli officials who openly regard the Kurds and the S.D.F. as a strategic asset in Syria. The presence of a semi-autonomous Kurdish region in the wealthiest part of Syria guarantees the political and economic fragmentation of a country that needs billions of dollars to begin rebuilding. Ultimately, maintaining an alliance with leftist, Marxist-leaning Kurdish militants fulfills the overarching policy of making the Syrian jihadist-led central authority as weak as possible.
H.T.S.’ Enemies: The Main Variable
When H.T.S. took over one city after another, they did not consider the whereabouts of former regime loyalists, including officials who likely maintain influence across all segments of Syrian society. Further complicating H.T.S.’ efforts to identify the enemy, Israel bombing key intelligence and military sites carrying sensitive documents has made H.T.S. vulnerable to acts of sabotage, whether orchestrated by those inside or outside Syria. According to reports, among those who allegedly escaped Syria are Maher al-Assad, Bashar’s loathed brother, and Ali al-Mamlouk, a maverick intelligence czar who maintains key connections to Syrian political and military elites as well as the intelligence communities of Russia and Iran.
While former al-Assad strongholds along the Alawite-heavy coast seem to be coping with the status quo, leaving tens of former regime conscripts, military commanders, and intelligence officials at large could lay the groundwork for an uprising in Alawite areas, a surprise attack launched by pro-Iranian militants in neighboring countries, or occasional terrorist attacks against the symbols of the new government’s rule. Al-Sharaa’s ambivalence towards Russia and Iran could become his Achilles’ heel because logic holds that an aspiring, yet weak leader must keep enemies close to gauge what their next move might be. Future relations with Iran and Russia cannot emerge from either al-Sharaa’s hatred towards Shiites who participated in massacres against Syrian civilians or Russia’s war crimes in support of the al-Assad regime. If al-Sharaa can live with Israel occupying more Syrian land without any justification, he should also accept the reality that his strategic, military, and intelligence impotence warrants robust relations with countries and factions that could derail stabilization efforts.
The Islamist, the Biggest Spoilers and Losers, Again
Aside from multifaceted complexities, the Islamists find themselves in a precarious situation due to their own hubris and overreach. Islamist political factions in the Middle East have failed repeatedly because of Islamist leaders compromising their values and beliefs for political gain. In Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood originally agreed to stay out of the post-revolution elections but changed their mind during zero hour when it became evident that they could come out on top. Even when the Brotherhood came to power, they did not win the hearts and minds of mainstream Egypt because of their obsession with portraying a softer side of Islamism. The Tunisian experiment also spiraled due to Islamists pulling out all the stops to woo the support of secular and undecided voters. In Libya, the Islamists ignored the merits of state-building, shifting from one UN-backed transitional phase to another to maintain their grip on power. Following the revolution of 2019, Sudan experienced similar dynamics with Islamists and Marxist labor unions avoiding elections to remain hegemonic actors in each failed UN-supervised transition.
The current Islamist project in Syria is quite similar, this time with full-blown jihadists suddenly abandoning their long-standing ideals with a single aim: consolidating power and winning the support of international backers. Extremists who ruled Idlib with an iron fist and foreign-based Brotherhood affiliates who have neither the acumen nor the experience to build institutions should not be permitted to usher in one transition after another to prevent free and fair elections. The Islamists understand that the political battle will be far more difficult than the bloodless coup that brought them to power. Among millions of Syrians within and outside the country are merchants who benefited from al-Assad’s rule and wartime policies, moderate Sunnis who deplore jihadist rule, and minorities who can never trust shadowy figures who weeks ago perpetuated takfiri values. The only short-term solution for Syria is elections to pave the way for the creation of a government that can confront severe problems, including the specter of former regime loyalists waging an insurgency and Israel’s open determination to partition the state along confessional and ethnic lines.
