“Never in modern history have so many people faced starvation and famine as in Sudan today,” experts selected by the United Nations Human Rights Council stated in October 2024.[i]
On August 6th, 2024, a senior United Nations official warned the United Nations Security Council about the urgency of the humanitarian crisis in Sudan, and the chance of preventing its further decline. “Our warnings have not been heard,” said Stephen Omollo, Assistant Executive Director for Workplace and Management of the World Food Programme (WFP).[ii] Between December 2024 and May 2025, the famine areas are projected to spread to five more regions in North Darfur,[iii] with an additional 17 areas at risk.[iv] Additionally, the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations (FAO) provides veterinary services, promotes local livestock production and emergency supplies, and, regardless of logistical difficulties, distributes more than 5,000 metric tons of seeds to approximately 550,000 families, reaching 2.7 million people.[v]
Sudan’s armed conflict, driven by a power struggle between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), erupted on 15 April 2023 and remains ongoing. It has resulted in approximately 20,000 deaths, 33,000 injuries, and the displacement of 11.5 million people, both internally and to neighbouring countries such as Egypt, Chad, Ethiopia, and South Sudan.[vi][vii] The conflict has affected 25.6 million people – over half of Sudan’s population – including 14 million children now living under conditions of extreme starvation.[viii] While recognising the war’s multifaceted causes, including Sudan’s geostrategic importance which attracts the influence of Gulf States and other African powers[ix], this essay highlights the failure of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) to enforce the prohibition of starvation as a method of warfare. Consequently, it exposes IHL’s inability to protect civilians during Sudan’s war. The essay calls for robust enforcement mechanisms, unimpeded humanitarian access, and enhanced international accountability under IHL.
Starvation as a ‘War Weapon’ and its Prohibition under IHL
IHL, which encompasses rules to limit the impact of armed conflict and protect both combatants and civilians, guaranteeing fundamental human rights[x], is being severely tested in Sudan’s war. IHL’s principal treaties, including the four Geneva Conventions of 1949, prohibit the use of starvation as a method of warfare in both international and non-international armed conflicts.[xi] This prohibition is articulated in Additional Protocol I, Article 54: 1-2.[xii] The Article forbids actions that prevent or delay access to humanitarian aid and the destruction of resources essential to human survival, such as food, water, and agricultural necessities.[xiii] The Geneva Conventions require parties to allow victims to receive indispensable supplies (Article 3) and to enable humanitarian bodies to provide services and relief to civilian populations in an exclusive and impartial manner (Article 18, Additional Protocol II).[xiv][xv] Moreover, IHL’s core principle of distinction requires parties to differentiate between combatants and non-combatants, focusing solely on military targets and avoiding harm to civilians.[xvi] However, this principle, along with those of humanity, proportionality, limitation, and military necessity[xvii], has been largely disregarded during Sudan’s war.
The use of starvation as a weapon is evident in the systematic actions of the RSF and SAF to disrupt and block food and other humanitarian supplies[xviii][xix], resulting in the world’s worst hunger crisis.[xx] The shortage of food, medicine, and fuel has left 25.6 million people in long-term food insecurity.[xxi][xxii] This situation, classified as ‘Phase 5’ under the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC), is indicative of famine conditions.[xxiii] It arises when over one-fifth of the population faces starvation, destitution, acute malnutrition, and death.[xxiv] This has been observed in places such as the Zamzam camp, where access to humanitarian aid is severely restricted.[xxv] The weaponisation of starvation continues in direct violation of IHL’s core principles.
Diplomatic Efforts under IHL
Various diplomatic efforts have been undertaken, including the US-Saudi-sponsored ‘Jeddah platform’.[xxvi] However, both SAF and RSF have failed to honour their commitments to uphold IHL principles, including respect for ceasefires and vacating civilian-occupied houses.[xxvii] Both parties withdrew from negotiations and continued to use starvation as a method of war by blocking humanitarian aid, destroying and looting food infrastructure, and preventing civilians from accessing food across battle lines.[xxviii][xxix][xxx] The United Nations Security Council’s resolution of 8 March 2024, which called for a cessation of hostilities, was followed by negotiations mediated by Libya and Turkey,[xxxi] as well as US-sponsored ceasefire talks held in Switzerland in August 2024.[xxxii]
These efforts failed, resulting in the securing of only one-third of the required $2.7 billion in aid,[xxxiii] thereby worsening the humanitarian crisis.
While foreign funding is crucial in supporting civilians’ access to food and basic medical needs, other forms of support, such as the involvement of foreign fighters, add to the conflict’s complexity. Numerous reports indicate that Chad and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have provided funding and weapons to the RSF, with Sudan playing a key role in the UAE’s strategic interests in Africa and the Middle East.[xxxiv] The UAE is also the primary importer of Sudan’s gold. Despite these claims, the UAE has denied involvement in the conflict, contradicting reports from a UN panel of experts.[xxxv]
The Way Forward and Concluding Remarks
The crisis in Sudan, exacerbated by the weak accountability of IHL’s signatories, underscores the need to strengthen its enforcement mechanisms. International efforts to assist war victims have been systematically undermined by the two parties’ continued obstruction of humanitarian access, leading to the starvation of civilians. This reveals a significant weakness in IHL, which lacks a ‘hard law’ instrument to punish violators, including Sudan, a signatory to IHL.[xxxvi]
Under IHL, all states are obliged to respect and ensure compliance with its provisions in all circumstances. In cases of non-international armed conflicts, such as those in Sudan, non-state armed groups are also required to uphold IHL, prevent violations, and punish perpetrators, as stipulated in Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, Protocol I of 1977, and IHL’s customary rules.[xxxvii] While enforcement remains challenging, IHL provides mechanisms for action through both national and international courts, including investigation procedures and the establishment of international fact-finding commissions.[xxxviii] The primary responsibility for enforcement lies with the national judiciary, while military commanders are held accountable for war crimes committed by individuals under their command.[xxxix]
While the international justice system plays a subsidiary role in IHL’s enforcement mechanisms, the international community must address instances of non-compliance. This includes pursuing charges of ‘Starvation War Crimes’ under the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (ICC). This crime is codified in Article 8(2)(b)(xxv) of the ICC Statute for international armed conflicts (IACs) and Article 8(2)(e)(xix) for non-international armed conflicts (NIACs), such as the one in Sudan, which is also recognised as a customary war crime.[xl] The prohibition covers the intentional use of starvation of civilians as a method of warfare by depriving them of food, water, and other objects essential to survival. In cases of serious violations of IHL there are precedents where the legal basis for international justice has been established. These include the Nuremberg Charter of the International Military Tribunal (1945), the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (1946), the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (UNSC Resolution 827 of 1993), the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (UNSC Resolution 955 of 1994), and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.[xli]
In the current case of Sudan’s non-international armed conflict, urgent action is required, as it poses an imminent risk of escalating into an international conflict,[xlii] causing instability across Africa and beyond, and triggering refugee flows into Europe.[xliii] Parallel international efforts through the UN Security Council should secure ceasefires and ensure humanitarian access. In essence, diplomatic efforts, along with media and public pressure, must be intensified as they play a significant role in ensuring the implementation of IHL. Saving lives must be the ultimate goal, alongside pursuing ICC efforts to prosecute the ‘Starvation War Crime’.