The survival of the Assad regime now depends on coordination and mutual understanding between Iran, Russia, and Turkey.

The sudden territorial gains of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) in northern Syria, including Aleppo—Syria’s second-largest city—have reawakened the nation’s dormant civil war. Although these developments may catch some off guard, they are neither unexpected nor unprecedented. In fact, they have been a long time coming; the regime of Bashar al-Assad has been vulnerable to such upheaval for years.

First, for over a decade, the Syrian army had struggled to obtain the upper hand in a brutal civil war, resulting in a decline in its military capabilities and morale. While the situation had notably stabilized in favor of Assad’s regime since 2018, the Syrian army never received a chance to recover. Once considered a proud military force, the Syrian Arab Army has, in recent years, devolved into a fragmented patchwork of factions and militias heavily influenced by foreign powers, including Iran, Hezbollah, and Russia.

The presence and activity of external forces, establishing bases and asserting control across the country, have likely impacted troop morale. Many have begun to question the extent to which they are truly fighting for their country’s sovereignty. Additionally, the Syrian army’s infrastructure, command centers, and bases have been relentlessly targeted by Israeli airstrikes over the past decade. Hundreds of these strikes have critically weakened its operational capacity. These external pressures, alongside the army’s decline and frustration, dealt a serious blow to the overall effectiveness of the Syrian army.

The second factor behind the current developments in Syria is Russia’s so-called “Ukrainian fatigue,” or more precisely, the strain caused by its protracted war in Ukraine. Back in 2015, when Russia declared its support for Assad, it played a pivotal role in restoring the regime’s health. Massive Russian airstrikes were critical in shifting the balance of the civil war, allowing the Syrian regime, supported by Iranian forces and allied Shia militias, to gain the upper hand.

However, the situation today is vastly different. Russia’s focus has shifted almost entirely to the war effort in Ukraine, with little capacity to spare. Although Russia still maintains a military presence in Syria and has launched more airstrikes against the rebels, its priorities lie in the conflict in Europe. Limited ammunition and resources are being channeled toward the Ukrainian front, and much of Russia’s elite military personnel, particularly its air force, have been redeployed there.

This diversion of resources and attention has significantly weakened Russia’s ability to support the Syrian regime as effectively as before. Consequently, this shift has further eroded the morale of the Syrian armed forces and emboldened rebel factions, who have seized the opportunity to exploit Russia’s diminished focus on Syria.

Syria has also suffered from the decline of its primary support system, the Axis of Resistance. The second reason could be that throughout much of the Syrian Civil War, this coalition—a network of Iranian-backed Shia militias from Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen—was essential in assisting the Assad regime and driving its military advances. However, in the past year, the dynamics within this alliance have shifted significantly.

Since October 7, 2023, the Israel-Hezbollah conflict has escalated to unprecedented levels. During the recent war between Israel and Hezbollah, Israel inflicted severe blows to Hezbollah’s military capabilities. Approximately4,000 elite Hezbollah fighters, as well as Hassan Nasrallah and other senior figures, were killed. The group’s command structure was severely damaged, and although new commanders have been appointed, the leadership overhaul has undoubtedly left the militias in a semi-paralyzed state.

Moreover, the heightened conflict with Israel has compelled Hezbollah to redirect much of its attention and resources toward Lebanon, significantly detracting from its involvement in Syria. This shift has created a gap in the Assad regime’s support network. The reduced backing from Hezbollah and other Iranian-aligned elements has further undermined the regime’s capacity to maintain control and effectively address the challenges it faces.

Another contributing factor is the internal state of Syria, particularly within the territories under Assad’s control. Since 2018, the Assad regime has managed to regain control of approximately 70 percent of the country. However, it has struggled to sustain control over outlying areas. Syria continues to face severe economic challenges, and the government has been unable to provide even basic services like the power supply. Many areas under regime control have endured years without reliable access to electricity, further fueling public dissatisfaction.

This dire situation has sparked protests in regions that were traditionally considered strongholds of support for the regime. These demonstrations expose the growing gap between regions that previously backed Assad. These events have not only demoralized Syrian troops but also undermined the regime’s institutional stability, creating opportunities for opposition groups, including rebels and the HTS movement, to advance their positions.

Nevertheless, none of this means that Assad’s fate is sealed. The regime still has pathways to survival. To endure, Assad must first and foremost maintain his control over the political establishment in Damascus. Any coup or internal mutiny within the Ba’athist regime, especially while it faces a major threat from northern rebels, could lead to the total collapse of the government. Preserving internal unity is, therefore, critical.

Second, Assad’s regime must slow the rebels’ advances in the short term. By temporarily stabilizing the frontlines, the regime could give Iran time to mobilize and deploy Iraqi militias to bolster Syrian forces. Additionally, it would allow Russia to reassess its position and potentially redirect more resources to Syria, at least temporarily, to counter the rebel threat. Such reinforcements could be critical for Assad to maintain his hold on power.

Finally, ensuring the survival of the Assad regime, now more than ever, requires greater coordination and mutual understanding between Iran, Russia, and Turkey. While some suggest that Turkey may be supporting the rebel advance, this view overlooks Ankara’s likely aversion to the total collapse of the Syrian regime. Factors such as Turkey’s wariness of HTS (previously linked to Al Qaeda), concerns over the group’s future trajectory, and the potential for Syrian Kurds to exploit any ensuing chaos are elements that might push Ankara toward favoring limited objectives and some level of de-escalation soon. Therefore, cooperation among these key players could serve as a lifeline for the regime as it navigates the perils facing it.

Dr. Arman Mahmoudian is a research fellow at the USF Global and National Security Institute and an adjunct professor at the USF Judy Genshaft Honors College.

Image: Mohammed Bash / Shutterstock.com.