Geostrategic Media Political Commentary, Analysis, Security, Defense
During his four years in office, President Joe Biden has been focused on executing an East Asia strategy aimed at countering China’s influence. This has been achieved through the reinforcement of alliances and strategic partnerships like the Security Assistance Program (SAP), the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF), and multilateral security dialogues. Biden’s goal has been to increase tension around China’s borders by collaborating with nations across the region, including New Zealand, Australia, Japan, South Korea, Vietnam, and the Philippines. One of Biden’s key objectives has been strengthening the Philippines’ defense capabilities. In February 2022, during a visit by U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin, the two countries signed an Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement. This allowed the U.S. military to expand its presence by developing infrastructure across nine bases in the Philippines, up from four. The increased U.S. presence offers a strategic edge over Beijing in the disputed South China Sea and also improves U.S. response capabilities in a potential conflict over Taiwan. Recently, three new U.S. bases have become operational on Luzon Island, just 160 miles from Taiwan.
In September 2023, Biden visited Vietnam, upgrading U.S.-Vietnam relations from a “comprehensive” to a “comprehensive strategic” partnership amid rising concerns in Hanoi over China’s territorial claims. Indonesia has also caught Biden’s attention, with the two nations elevating their partnership last year to a “comprehensive strategic partnership.” They are now working on closer security cooperation, particularly in monitoring maritime activity to counter China. Singapore, while not formally part of U.S. security pacts like the Quad (comprising Australia, India, Japan, and the U.S.) or AUKUS (involving the U.S., U.K., and Australia), has quietly provided access to Changi Naval Base, located in the strategically crucial Malacca Strait, a vital artery for China’s trade routes. Singapore also participates in military exercises with the U.S. and its allies, lending tacit support to Washington’s regional security initiatives.
However, should Donald Trump win the 2024 election, the status of various countries in the Indo-Pacific would face a dual paradox. While traditional U.S. allies in Europe fear Trump’s return, leaders like Shinzo Abe and Narendra Modi of Japan and India welcomed his anti-China stance. Australia, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and other Southeast Asian nations, despite potential reservations, continue to see Trump as an ally against the common threat posed by China. These nations would likely have little choice but to continue cooperating with the U.S. and may even find themselves accommodating some of Trump’s more unconventional demands. They understand well that Trump seeks maximum pressure on China, and they may look to capitalize on this geopolitical tension to enhance their own economic and industrial positions. A testament to this is Trump’s previous promise to impose a 60% tariff on Chinese imports and a minimum 10% tax on goods from all nations, including close U.S. allies.
Smaller and weaker East Asian and European nations, however, would face a different challenge under Trump. His confrontational policies toward China, coupled with demands for paying for security against Russia, would place them in a difficult position. Lacking the resources to bear the costs of countering Beijing’s hegemony, these nations would find themselves trapped between Trump’s unpredictable policies and China’s expansionist ambitions. For instance, Malaysia received little attention from Trump’s administration and, since October 7th, has taken a strong stance on the Israel-Hamas conflict, condemning Israel and openly supporting Hamas. Such positions could complicate Malaysia’s future relations with the U.S., given Trump’s unwavering support for Israel. Similarly, Cambodia and Laos are both deeply aligned within China’s geostrategic orbit, adding further complexity to their regional standing.
Another significant issue for U.S. allies in Europe and East Asia is the contrasting political longevity between U.S. presidents and China’s leadership. While American presidents are limited to four or eight years in office, China’s leaders enjoy long-term stability in their authoritarian system. If Harris loses in the upcoming November election, the path ahead for East Asian countries will be clearer. Democrats’ multilateral approach, centered around expanding Western military bases in the Western Pacific to contain China, will likely continue. As Biden indicated in his latest speech at the NATO summit, Democrats would focus on accelerating NATO’s global influence and recruiting more countries into the alliance. With China’s military and economic power on the rise, Harris will likely push to bring more countries in the region into the NATO fold.
Biden views U.S. security through the lens of NATO’s power and safeguarding borders far from home. For him, every country, no matter its resources, is a pawn in his strategic chess game aimed at checkmating Beijing and Moscow. On the other hand, Trump’s foreign policy is primarily inward-looking. His return to the White House would likely create a rift between Western allies and countries unwilling to pay the high price of U.S. security demands. The larger Indo-Pacific powers, such as India and Japan, due to their significant roles in the global economy and their ability to handle Washington’s pressure in containing China, would likely adapt to Trump. Both nations successfully navigated Trump’s presidency during his first term.
Meanwhile, smaller countries like Laos, Myanmar, and Cambodia, lacking the means to finance Trump’s security demands, will continue to rely on their economic ties and territorial security with neighboring China. These countries are likely to pursue their interests through frameworks like BRICS, ASEAN, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, ensuring they play a “good neighbor” role with China, at least until Trump’s term ends.
Ultimately, whether Harris or Trump wins, the outcome may not significantly alter the political calculus for Southeast Asian countries. However, a Trump victory in 2024 would have significant implications for a divided Europe, already grappling with the Ukraine war and the rise of far-right movements.
