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Europe’s Silent Struggle: How Beijing is “Boursicoting” the Continent

Larisa Marks

The story of Shi Pei Pu, a Beijing opera singer and spy, and his twenty-year deception of French diplomat Bernard Boursicot is a cautionary tale that resonates today. In the 1960s, Shi posed as a woman, even presenting a child as their supposed offspring, all to coerce Boursicot into passing French embassy documents to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). This tale of espionage, secrecy, and naivety is more than just a historical anecdote; it is a metaphor for the broader, ongoing influence operations that China conducts in Europe.

Today, Europe finds itself in a “smokeless war” with Beijing, as Chinese influence operations—spearheaded by the United Front Work Department—continue to expand across the continent. Belgium, home to NATO headquarters and major EU institutions, is a key target. Recently, a Chinese aide to Maximilian Krah, a German MEP from the far-right AfD party, was arrested for passing European Parliament information to China. This incident underscores the CCP’s relentless efforts to infiltrate and influence European political institutions.

One of China’s primary objectives in Europe is authoritarian co-option—convincing European elites to adopt favorable views of the CCP and advocate for its policies. These captured elites become proxies, promoting the CCP’s agenda in political, business, and decision-making circles, creating an echo chamber that amplifies Beijing’s voice in Europe. A notable example is Belgian politician Frank Creyelman, who was exposed as a Chinese agent in 2022. Creyelman’s handler from China’s Ministry of State Security had a clear mission: to “divide the U.S.-European relationship.”

Moreover, China’s influence operations are not limited to political elites. Under “Operation Fox Hunt,” the CCP pursues Chinese officials suspected of corruption who have fled abroad, using a global network of clandestine “police stations” in fifty-three countries to monitor and intimidate the Chinese diaspora. These stations also target minority groups like Uyghurs, Tibetans, and Hongkongers, stifling any dissent against the CCP.

As the United States imposes stricter export controls on advanced technologies, China has intensified its efforts in Europe, seeking to acquire critical knowledge through legal and illegal means. The CCP’s methods include investments, cyber espionage, and technology theft, highlighting the overlap between Chinese and Russian influence activities in Europe. The cases of Creyelman and Krah reveal that parliamentary assistants and ex-legislators are soft targets for espionage by both Chinese and Russian intelligence.

Additionally, Chinese organized crime groups in Europe cooperate with China’s undeclared police officers to monitor and intimidate overseas Chinese communities. In exchange for their services, these criminal groups enjoy protection from prosecution by Chinese authorities, who also shield them from extradition if they seek refuge in China.

Given the extensive and multi-faceted nature of these influence operations, what should Europe do?

Europe must avoid repeating Bernard Boursicot’s mistake of being deceived by the CCP’s ruses. Instead, the continent needs to “flip on the light switch” and confront the reality of China’s influence operations. This requires a coordinated, trans-Atlantic strategy that also involves NATO’s Indo-Pacific partners—Australia, Japan, South Korea, and New Zealand—leveraging their experience in countering Chinese influence. Here are some actionable steps Europe can take:

  1. Investigate and Raise Awareness: Conduct thorough investigations into Chinese influence operations to understand their mechanisms and increase public awareness, making them easier to counteract.
  2. Adopt Anti-Espionage Laws: Countries without anti-espionage legislation should consider enacting such laws to safeguard national security.
  3. Support Independent Chinese-Language Media: Strengthen independent media outlets that cater to the Chinese diaspora, countering the influence of Beijing-controlled media.
  4. Strengthen Counter-Intelligence: Draw on Cold War-era strategies to bolster counter-intelligence capabilities and protect against foreign influence.
  5. Counter Foreign Information Manipulation: Enhance efforts to combat disinformation and foreign interference in domestic affairs.
  6. Promote Transparency: Advocate for a foreign-influence transparency registry to ensure greater visibility and accountability in lobbying and influence operations.
  7. Invest in Education: Increase investment in Chinese language and culture education to better understand the CCP’s operations and prepare the next generation of specialists.

As Europe navigates this complex landscape, policymakers and intelligence agencies must innovate, educate, and adapt to the evolving threats posed by Beijing. A well-calibrated response, rooted in the values of freedom, openness, and lawfulness, will help protect democratic institutions and strengthen resilience against the CCP’s expanding influence. By staying vigilant and proactive, Europe can avoid being “Boursicoted” and safeguard its sovereignty in this ongoing “smokeless war.”