Geostrategic Media Political Commentary, Analysis, Security, Defense
Tereza Felix
The U.S. strategy in the Red Sea, particularly its approach to the Houthi threat, raises crucial questions about the effectiveness and proportionality of American military power. Over the past nine months, the U.S. has committed a significant portion of its naval resources to counter the Houthi blockade of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, a vital maritime corridor. The dispatch of four consecutive carrier strike groups (CSGs) to the region—most recently the USS Abraham Lincoln—signals a commitment to protecting international shipping. Yet, this strategy appears increasingly disproportionate to the actual threat and the broader interests of the United States.
The Biden administration’s response to the Houthi aggression has been to deploy the Navy to intercept missile and drone attacks directly, an approach that might seem proportional but is ultimately misguided. This method ties up valuable strategic resources and depletes the U.S. arsenal of irreplaceable munitions, all to manage a third-tier threat. The U.S. response is not only disproportionate in terms of military effort but also misaligned with America’s strategic interests in the region.
The Bab el-Mandeb Strait, through which 14% of global maritime trade passes, is undoubtedly important. However, elevating it to the same level of strategic significance as the Euro-Atlantic, Middle East, and Indo-Pacific theaters—where the U.S. maintains a continuous carrier presence—stretches an already overextended Navy. The result is the creation of a de facto “Aden Station,” demanding constant attention and resources that could be better allocated elsewhere.
Moreover, this strategy has failed to achieve its primary objective: ensuring the safe passage of shipping through the Bab el-Mandeb. Despite the U.S. Navy’s presence, many shipping companies now avoid the area, resulting in a nearly 50% year-over-year decline in traffic and a $2 billion loss in revenue for the Suez Canal. This outcome suggests that the current strategy is insufficient to safeguard U.S. interests.
The administration’s approach reflects a broader trend in American foreign policy—a reluctance to decisively secure U.S. interests, opting instead for a measured, “proportional” response that ultimately achieves little. A more effective strategy would involve escalating the response to the Houthi threat, either by empowering regional allies like Saudi Arabia to take more aggressive action or by directly targeting the root of the problem: Iranian support for the Houthis.
This shift in strategy would likely involve a short-term escalation but could ultimately free the U.S. from the costly and indefinite commitment to maintaining a naval presence in the Red Sea. By addressing the root causes of the conflict rather than merely managing its symptoms, the U.S. could reassert its strategic priorities and better allocate its military resources.
The current U.S. approach to the Red Sea crisis is emblematic of a post-Cold War mindset that prioritizes restraint and moderation at the expense of decisive action. This mindset, while often seen as morally superior, fails to secure America’s interests and leaves the U.S. entangled in conflicts with no clear resolution. As the U.S. continues to face complex global challenges, it may be time to reconsider the virtues of a “disproportional response”—one that aligns military efforts with strategic objectives and secures America’s interests more effectively.
The next administration would do well to learn from the shortcomings of the current strategy and adopt a more assertive approach that genuinely reflects the importance of U.S. interests in the region.
